Russian navy struggles to maintain aging fleet amid modern threats

The missile cruisers of project 1144 are large ships. They have a displacement of approximately 26,000 metric tonnes, hulls 252 metres long, and are powered by two nuclear reactors that provide unlimited range. They feature 20 launchers for anti-ship missiles P-700 Granit, each 10 metres long and weighing about 7,000 kilograms. In addition, there are 12 launchers for anti-aircraft missiles of the S-300F Fort system, as well as shorter-range launchers and strong artillery.

The Soviet Union built four such ships in the 1970s and '80s—one under Project 1144 and three improved ones under Project 11442. The construction of large ships was part of an ambitious plan to transform the Soviet navy into an ocean fleet capable of challenging the US Navy.

Forty years ago, the specifications of the project 1144 missile cruisers might have been impressive. Still, today, the pride of the Russian fleet is akin to a "blind boxer"—a unit with theoretically strong offensive armament but dramatically outdated sensors, helpless against modern electronic warfare, and incapable of self-defence. The fate of the cruiser "Moskva" (a unit half its size, representing project 1164), destroyed by Ukrainians, shows what happens when outdated ships are sent into battle.

Russians are aware of the weaknesses of the last large ships in their fleet. That is why two of the four project 1144 units were decommissioned in the early 21st century, and the Northern Fleet's flagship, "Peter the Great", is slated for repairs. This will occur with the completion of the modernization of its sister ship, "Admiral Nakhimov". The current plan is for "Nakhimov" to return to service in 2026, and for "Peter the Great" to be removed from the fleet in 2030.

The issue is that the Russian cruiser has been under repair since 1997. It's worth noting that—as with the 18-year construction of the Polish corvette ORP "Ślązak"—an extremely long repair or construction period does not mean continuous work has been carried out. The process has been started, interrupted, and resumed many times—depending on current political decisions.

Despite this, the service history of the Russian cruiser is unusual. Launched in 1986 and incorporated into the fleet in 1988, the ship returned to the repair yard in 1997 and has not left since. In the last decade alone, the Kremlin announced multiple times that the ship would return to service: in 2018, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, and now claims are it will happen in 2026. Ukrainians estimate—though it's challenging to verify—that modernization costs could already reach $5 billion CAD.

A glimmer of hope for the eventual completion of these exceptionally long repairs is the news that one of the two KN-3 nuclear reactors, each with a capacity of 150 megawatts, powering "Admiral Nakhimov", has been activated. According to Ukrainian sources, this occurred as early as December 20, 2024, but Russian media reported it with a significant delay.

Although the rebuilding of "Admiral Nakhimov" won't transform it into a modern warship, it is meant to significantly enhance its capabilities. This involves the installation of an 80-container vertical launcher of the UKSK 3C14 system—Russia's equivalent of the Western Mk 41 VLS launchers. This allows warships to carry varied armaments for different missions, placed in covert under-the-deck vertical launchers.

Thanks to this upgrade, the old ship will gain the capability to launch modern Russian missiles for attacking ships and land targets, such as Zircon, Onyx, or Kalibr. Eighty starting containers are substantial for the Russian fleet. Notably, American Ticonderoga-class cruisers, with a third of its displacement, are equipped with 122 Mk 41 VLS launchers.

The potential return of "Admiral Nakhimov" to service will undoubtedly be portrayed by Russian propaganda as a major success and a significant boost to the navy. Years ago, the TASS agency, heralding the ship's return, proclaimed it as the most powerful warship in the world.

This assertion is, of course, incorrect, and the realities are quite different. The Russian navy, which aspired to be an ocean fleet in the 1980s, is steadily eroding and losing its capabilities.

The largest Russian warship—the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov—has been undergoing problematic repairs for so long that Russian naval aviation has effectively ceased to exist, just like the trained crew of the ship, part of which was redirected as infantry for the war in Ukraine.

The two nuclear missile cruisers are "Admiral Nakhimov", still undergoing endless repairs, and "Peter the Great", which continues to await repair. Two smaller conventionally powered cruisers, "Varyag" and "Marshal Ustinov", are contemporaries of "Moskva" with similar capabilities.

Russia can still organize propaganda cruises to Cuba or joint patrols with China near Japan or Alaska, but in terms of potential, its navy is a shadow of the maritime power the Soviet Union tried to establish years ago.

Russian shipyards continue to build frigates, corvettes, and submarines, or new landing ships, but the number of new units is insufficient to replace older, decommissioned ships and revitalize the fleet generationally.

The propaganda claims about plans to build new-generation large warships, such as a nuclear aircraft carrier based on the project 1143.7 developed back in the 1980s, can be considered entirely unreliable. The peak of Russian naval capabilities seems to be the delayed completion of the large helicopter-carrying landing ships of project 23900 Priboj.

This does not mean that the threat from Russian warships should be underestimated. This is especially crucial in the Baltic, where—despite the limited capabilities of Russian surface units—submarines remain a significant concern.

Although the Russian-developed project 677 (Lada class) was unsuccessful, the production of old, tried-and-true units of project 636 (now 636.3) is ongoing. Some of these are not only armed with torpedoes but can also launch Kalibr cruise missiles from underwater, posing a threat to navigation and land targets.