Could bombing have altered the Holocaust's tragic course?
Why didn't the Allies bomb Auschwitz? While today we understand that the technical capability to attack the camp was present, would an air raid have actually changed the fate of thousands of prisoners? Although an attack on Auschwitz was not carried out, bombs were dropped on nearby chemical plants. Years later, American presidents acknowledged that the decision not to attack Auschwitz was a significant mistake.
"We should have bombed it," said George W. Bush, then President of the United States, as he stood before an aerial photograph showing the Auschwitz camp. His words were directed at Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice but were heard and publicised by Avner Shalev, then head of Yad Vashem. Previously, although not explicitly, the issue of Allied inaction had been raised by Bill Clinton during the opening of the Washington Holocaust Museum.
“If, instead of Jews, thousands of English, American or Russian women, children and aged had been tortured every day, burnt to death, asphyxiated in gas chambers-would you have acted in the same way?” asked David Ben Gurion chairman of the Jewish Agency executive committee, in the summer of 1944.
The purpose of the camp was already well-known at that time, and reports of the Jewish extermination and the genocide perpetrated by the Germans at Auschwitz were reaching the desks of decision-makers. Jewish organisations were appealing for an aerial attack on the camp.
Bombing of Oświęcim
From 1943, Allied aviation was within reach of the potential target. This is evidenced not only by post-war speculations but also by eyewitness accounts: in the summer of 1944, Allied bombers appeared over Oświęcim.
The first planes reached the city on 14 April 1944. They conducted reconnaissance, photographing important chemical plants of IG Farbenindustrie (Werk Auschwitz O/S KL Auschwitz III) and the campgrounds. The bombings likely occurred four times: 20 August (B-17 planes), 13 September (B-24 jets), and twice more on 18 and 26 December.
None of these raids targeted Auschwitz directly, but two bombs did fall on camp buildings, resulting in the deaths of several dozen prisoners.
After the war, survivors of those events, Jewish activists, politicians, historians, and military researchers, began to question: why wasn't the entire camp destroyed, or at least the crematoria or railway infrastructure supplying thousands of new victims to Auschwitz?
According to British RAF Marshal Arthur Harris and the US War Department, it was not feasible due to the distance and the lack of suitable planes, which were directed towards attacking other targets deemed more important. Researchers such as David S. Wyman and Martin Gilbert, who thoroughly analysed Allied aviation capabilities, have criticised this explanation.
Operation Frantic
Four-engine strategic bombers, such as those participating in the raids on the Auschwitz IG Farben plant, B-17s, and B-24s, had a range of about 1,800 to 2,500 miles with a bomb load. Potential distance issues could have been compensated for, as evidenced by the series of operations code-named Frantic, during which American bombers attacked targets in Europe and, after dropping their bombs, landed on Soviet airfields instead of returning to base.
Hindrances from the Russians or catastrophic negligence, which led to the destruction of dozens of American aircraft by the Germans at the Poltava airfield, ended this cooperation.
Nonetheless, subsequent Frantic operations, like supply drops for Warsaw during the uprising, demonstrated that almost all of Europe was within reach of Allied aviation, and moving industrial plants by the Germans did not place them out of strategic bombers' range.
Not only strategic bombers
But could an air raid by such machines on the Auschwitz camp have made a difference? A thorough examination of these issues is found in the research of Ewa Cuber-Strutyńska, a PhD candidate at the Institute of History PAN, titled "The issue of bombing KL Auschwitz in light of selected studies".
The author refers to analyses highlighting at least three methods to destroy the camp infrastructure without massacring prisoners. Instead of using strategic bombers from high altitude, lighter B-25s was considered, although it would likely have resulted in significant losses among attacking machines.
Historian and expert Richard G. Davis, who specialised in American military aviation research, suggested another alternative. He proposed precise attacks on specific targets within the camp using planes such as the P-38 Lightning or Mosquito.
Although the P-38, with its distinctive twin-boom silhouette, is primarily a fighter, it can carry a bomb load similar to the B-17’s typical payload (just over two tons, though the B-17 can carry much more).
The Mosquito, constructed from materials such as plywood and fabric, was one of the most versatile aircraft of World War II. In 1944, it successfully executed missions that mirrored what a targeted attack on Auschwitz might have entailed.
Operation Jericho - planes free prisoners in Amiens
The British used Mosquito aircraft to attack the prison in Amiens, occupied France, aiming to enable the escape of French resistance members held there by the Germans.
The planes targeted specific parts of the facility, such as sections of the walls or specific buildings. The raid, involving a dozen machines, was a success (though contested after the war), resulting in the successful escape of over 180 detainees.
The raid became known as Operation Jericho, supporting the argument that a similar attack might have been feasible against Auschwitz.
How to end genocide?
Yet, opposing views exist. Simply bombing the camp and allowing prisoners to escape would not guarantee their survival, given a probable massive manhunt by the Germans.
The genocide machine would not have been halted by destroying gas chambers or crematoria. Albert Speer, one of the Nazi German leaders, remarked that in such cases, the Germans would extend their genocidal methods used in the USSR (i.e., shootings and mobile gas chambers).
The notion that interrupting or preventing prisoner deaths through the destruction of railway tracks is also debatable. Several railway routes supplied Auschwitz, and track destruction was repaired by specialised units in mere hours, not days.
Therefore, the question of whether bombing Auschwitz was feasible will likely forever divide historians. Political declarations on this subject, although widely publicised, remain personal opinions of individuals moved by the magnitude of the German genocide.
We may never know whether bombing Auschwitz or its railway tracks would have altered the Holocaust's scale. However, we know that it ultimately ended through the Allies' efforts, which did not focus on bombing individuals, even symbolic sites, but rather on achieving victory over the Third Reich.
