DDG(X) destroyers: The future of US naval supremacy

Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are the real workhorses of the US Navy. Developed in the 1980s and introduced into service since 1991, these ships are the first units designed at the project stage to install the AEGIS combat management system — the Ticonderoga-class cruisers, accepted into service a few years earlier, were adapted for this purpose.

The Arleigh Burke ships are considered successful. This opinion is confirmed by the 74 units built, as well as the fact that eight more are under construction, and more will follow — plans anticipate that a total of 99 destroyers will leave the shipyards.

Unfortunately, American guided missile destroyers are not without flaws. They were designed according to Cold War assumptions, and apart from the outdated concept, their relatively small hull imposes limitations. As further modernisations require more and more different installations that need more power to operate, constraints are being placed on them.

That’s why the United States has been working for over 30 years on a next-generation missile destroyer. So far unsuccessfully, as demonstrated by the failures of programmes like DD-21 or DD(X). Even the DD-1000 programme, which resulted in the futuristic Zumwalt-class destroyers, was halted after producing only three — instead of the planned 32 — units.

Meanwhile, the design of Arleigh Burke ships — despite their constant modernisation — imposes more and more compromises and limitations. This happens despite significant changes introduced in successive variants (referred to in this case as Flight).

When ships in the original Flight I version displaced — with a hull length of 154 metres — 9,200 tonnes, the latest Flight III variant has a displacement close to 11,000 tonnes. However, this is still not enough, and the modernisation capabilities of this design are nearing exhaustion.

As Rear Admiral William Daly noted, the average American household currently uses 40 percent more electricity than in the 1980s. The same is true for ships — new sensors, communication systems, and electronic warfare systems need more power. The demand for power further increases in the case of installing energy weapons, such as combat lasers.

At the same time — as shown by the experiences from US Navy operations in recent months in the Middle East — effectively countering current and future threats requires the use of new means.

During the Houthi attack defences American ships fired at least 120 SM-2 missiles, 80 SM-6 missiles, 160 Mark 45 naval gun rounds (127 mm), and 20 ESSM and SM-3 missiles. The total cost of the used combat means exceeded a billion dollars, and missile inventories had to be replenished.

The solution to some of these problems is energy weapons, which — despite many reservations — will sooner or later find their way onto American ship decks not as experiments but as standard solutions. They will then require more power than old ship installations can provide.

The response to this challenge is expected to be an entirely new, futuristic guided missile destroyer, developed under the DDG(X) programme. The new unit is not only to replace the currently used destroyers but will also assume the role — especially in terms of air defence — of the retired Ticonderoga-class cruisers.

The classification of ships in this case is purely nominal: class names do not reflect the differences in size or purpose. Ticonderoga-class cruisers were created as a modernisation of Spruance-class destroyers, Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyers have the displacement of cruisers, and Zumwalt-class destroyers are significantly larger than American cruisers.

New ships — formally developed as destroyers — with a displacement of 14,900 tonnes will also surpass the old cruisers (Ticonderoga-class has a displacement of about 11,000 tonnes).

For a long time, speculation about DDG(X) destroyers was based on old, several-years-old data and graphics, but during the farewell of one American commander, a new, updated visualisation of the new ship was revealed. As it turns out, many significant changes have been introduced in the concept.

The first and most striking is the absence of the bow gun turret. The ship also does not show a combat laser, but the need to provide energy surpluses for powering the ship's equipment and weapons was mentioned by Rear Admiral Daly. The main armament will be a 96-cell Mark 41 VLS launcher, part of which can be replaced with newer, larger G-VLS launchers, allowing the launch of new hypersonic missiles.

An important change will also be the possibility of mounting an additional hull section called the Destroyer Payload Module — an extra 25 metres of space, which can be allocated for additional launchers or equipment for handling maritime drones, depending on the needs.

The iconic last-chance weapon of the US Navy — Phalanx CIWS artillery systems with a six-barrel, rotating M61 Vulcan cannon (20 mm) — will also disappear from the ship. Their task is to destroy anti-ship missiles, motorboats, or drones piercing the ship’s defence from a minimal distance. To make this possible, Phalanx has a rate of fire reaching 4,500 rounds per minute. On new ships, Phalanx systems will be replaced by the RIM-116 RAM missile system.

All these — quite revolutionary — changes are to be implemented on a ship whose construction has not yet begun. The entry into service of the first unit is currently being postponed from the original 2028 to the 2030s.

At the same time — to minimise the risk of failure — sensors and combat management system elements intended for DDG(X) ships are to be gradually implemented on currently constructed Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. This is to ensure that proposed solutions are tested in advance and that there is time to refine the final weapons — both energy and hypersonic — for the new ships.

This is critically important because the US Navy no longer has time for further failed development programmes. The core of the American fleet consists of ships designed during the Cold War, which — despite modernisation — increasingly fall short of the realities of the third decade of the 21st century.

The withdrawal of Spruance-class destroyers and Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, the withdrawal of Ticonderoga-class cruisers (though they will not be scrapped, but preserved for potential conflict), problems with FFG(X) frigates, or the costly and controversial LCS shipbuilding programme — all these affect the capabilities of the US Navy.

In the meantime, a potential adversary, the Chinese Navy, is not idle, building dozens of new and — presumably — modern ships. Although their real capabilities remain unknown, they pose a challenge that the US Navy aims to face. New, numerous ships are indispensable in such a situation.