Kremlin's ambitions reignite: NATO's strategic dilemma in focus

Currently, there is no imminent threat of a Russian attack, but the risk is expected to increase in the coming years. If the Kremlin perceives NATO as weakened, Russia might be prepared to commence a new, large-scale war in Europe within five years. These are the primary conclusions drawn from the report released by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS report).

The release of these intelligence analyses comes at a significant moment. The conflict in Ukraine is nearing its third anniversary (though it's important to note that Russia has been involved in hostilities in Ukraine for 11 years). This anniversary coincides with geopolitical shifts influenced by declarations from Donald Trump and actions from the current American administration.

In this context, Danish intelligence presents three scenarios of potential Russian aggression, none of which depend on Russia’s defeat in Ukraine, but rather on some form of cessation or suspension of hostilities:

• Six months after the cessation of hostilities, Russia would be able to attack one of its neighbours.
• Two years post-hostilities, Russia could initiate a regional war in the Baltic Sea region against multiple countries.
• Within five years, Russia could restore its capability for a comprehensive attack on Europe.

Russia's need to rebuild its offensive capabilities is a direct result of significant losses sustained in Ukraine. Even if the reported destruction of 10,000 Russian tanks by Kyiv is an exaggeration, the loss of thousands of armoured vehicles has compelled the Kremlin to deplete mobilisation storage facilities housing Cold War-era equipment.

The Russian air force faces an even more severe predicament. Moscow is manufacturing too few aircraft to replace current losses and is depleting existing machines with no prospects for replacement. This lack of both new aircraft and advanced designs suggests that the decline of Russian military aviation will persist.

It is worth noting, however, that predictions throughout the war about a crisis in the Russian industry and a rapid depletion of Russia's stocks of tanks, ammunition, and ballistic missiles have not materialised as expected (source).

Despite the current production and refurbishment rates not fully accounting for losses (source), the Russian economy, now operating in a wartime mode—and with support from China in terms of building production capacity—is supplying weapons in volumes unforeseen before the conflict. This is supplemented by supplies of arms and ammunition from Iran and North Korea.

Russia has also revitalised its training system. The previous waves of "mobiks" (new recruits) being deployed in 2022 without adequate training and equipment are a thing of the past. According to experts like Col. Piotr Lewandowski, the average Russian soldier now entering combat is better trained than the typical Ukrainian soldier.

Furthermore, Russia is managing to conduct the war without imposing conscription, instead relying on volunteers lured by very high salaries to head to the front lines.

The Russian threat compels a response; countries on NATO's eastern flank, along with new Alliance members, are enhancing their armed forces capabilities. Although industrial capacities remain a weak spot, there is gradual improvement in this area.

Statements by President Trump do not necessarily mean the United States intends to abandon European defence; rather, they appear to be an attempt to prompt European NATO members to increase their defence spending collectively.

Another critical aspect of the Danish report is the Arctic and Russia's aspirations to maintain dominance in the far north. From Moscow's viewpoint, the Arctic is an area of critical importance, both economically (in terms of resources and shipping routes) and strategically.

Climate change means that the Arctic, previously a safe haven for Russian nuclear submarines with intercontinental missiles, is becoming accessible for longer periods each year to the navies of potential adversaries. For Moscow, this represents a serious challenge, as all Arctic countries, except for Russia, are NATO members.

This balance of power in the Arctic may shift with China's involvement. China has officially declared itself a "near-Arctic country" and aims to defend its interests in the far north by building a fleet of icebreakers.

The Danish report serves less as a prediction and more as a warning, emphasising the actions that, if neglected, could lead to another war in Europe.

Apart from the outlined timelines, the report identifies conditions for a possible Russian attack. The first is a lack of engagement from the United States, and the second is NATO's failure to respond to Russian rearmament.

The conclusions are clear: Russia will only attack if NATO is weak and neglects its military development, and if political divisions within the Alliance result in the United States withdrawing from Europe. This serves as a stark directive for NATO countries on measures to prevent any future Russian aggression.