Russian military recruitment strains economy amid rising costs
The massive recruitment into the Russian army is increasingly burdening taxpayers. According to estimates by German expert Janis Kluge, approximately 2 billion rubles are spent daily on bonuses for contract soldiers.
Of the total expenditure—according to Kluge's estimates—about three-quarters (1.5 billion rubles, approximately £13.8 million) are borne by regional authorities, which are compelled to allocate nearly 3 per cent of their budgets to the recruitment campaign. The remaining portion, 0.5 billion rubles (£4.6 million), is funded by the federal budget.
The war is becoming increasingly costly. Russians are running out of money and people
Kluge's calculations show that at present, the recruitment campaign supplies the army with 1,000 to 1,500 new soldiers daily. The influx of "volunteers" remains steady compared to the end of last year, despite the cessation of mass increases in bonuses in regions. Their average amount in 37 entities of the Russian Federation is currently 1.4 million rubles (approximately £12,900).
Compared to last year, Kluge's estimates suggest that the influx of contract soldiers has nearly doubled and completely compensates for the frontline losses, which NATO estimates at about 1,000 people daily.
Expenditures on the "recruitment machine" have increased nearly fivefold compared to April 2024 and—if the current pace persists—by the end of the year it will cost the Russian budget 730 billion rubles (approximately £6.7 billion). This amounts to half of the annual budget for the entire higher education system in the country (1.5 trillion rubles annually) and twice the annual expenditures on the national "Health" project, which for the current year is 369 billion rubles.
The recruitment machine is stalling. Russia is consuming its reserves
Last year, the Russian Ministry of Defence managed to recruit 440,000 individuals for the war with Ukraine, averaging about 1,200 per day. However, according to George Barros, head of the Russia team at the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Kremlin will not be able to sustain the current recruitment pace indefinitely. According to the expert, Russia still has 12 to 16 months to conduct military operations in the current mode.
According to ISW, further increases in bonuses will be hampered by budgetary challenges and the depletion of reserves in the National Wealth Fund. Over three years of war, the liquid assets of the NWF have decreased threefold—by 106 billion dollars (approximately £80 billion), and the remaining available funds are about 40 billion dollars—the lowest since the fund's inception in 2008.
Barros explains that although the soldier recruitment system functioned effectively for two and a half years, it is now starting to fall apart. He points out that Russia faces limitations imposed by economic realities and resource shortages, and also lacks an endless supply of manpower.
