Russia's evolving military: What post-Ukraine holds in store
The war in Ukraine serves as yet another testing ground for Moscow, following Chechnya and Georgia, allowing for an assessment of the quality of the Russian army. The armed forces that Russia will build in the coming years could significantly differ from those currently engaged in Ukraine. What can we anticipate in the upcoming years?
When will Russia be ready for another assault? The publicised analyses of Danish intelligence have made a significant impact, suggesting that Russia will regain the capability to attack NATO roughly five years after the conclusion of the war in Ukraine.
Similar timelines have been suggested by Polish experts, such as Reserve Colonel Maciej Korowaj (around five years), the German intelligence community (by the end of the current decade), and Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, General Carsten Breuer (2029). American intelligence and Reserve Major Michał Fiszer offer a slightly shorter timeline, indicating Russia's readiness to attack by as soon as 2028.
These assessments are usually accompanied by a disclaimer that readiness to attack does not necessarily equate to the commencement of a war.
Moscow's expansionist ambitions may be restrained by the rebuilding of Western military capabilities – the same capabilities that effectively deterred the USSR and the Eastern Bloc for half a century during the Cold War from executing scenarios like "In seven days to the river Rhine" or other attack variants on the West.
Rebuilding the training system
Russia, despite the substantial losses incurred over the past three years, is still capable of swiftly rebuilding its potential. This capability is evident from the current situation in Ukraine: the waves of poorly trained and ill-equipped Russian soldiers, derogatorily referred to as "mobiks," are a thing of the past.
Although the media reports on the largest spring conscription for the Russian army in years, the current initiative at the front has been gained by the Russians without involving conscripts. Professional soldiers and volunteers who have chosen to sign a contract are fighting in Russian units in Ukraine. Conscripts are only fighting within Russia's borders – in the Kursk and Belgorod regions – where, according to Russian terminology, an anti-terrorist operation is being conducted.
Furthermore, the re-established training system, after decades of decline, means that – as assessed by Reserve Colonel Piotr Lewandowski, among others – the Russian soldiers currently deployed to the front are, on average, better trained than their Ukrainian counterparts.
Where have 600 Russian tanks gone?
The revival of the training system is accompanied by the surprisingly high resilience of the Russian industry, compared to forecasts from two years ago. Although mobilisation warehouses are already running low and, at the current rate of losses, Russia will soon lose, in some equipment categories, the ability to replenish them.
Strategic aviation, the navy, and certain types of anti-aircraft systems are in an increasingly poor state, and over time their condition may deteriorate further.
Nevertheless, Russia – as estimated by civilian analyst Jarosław Wolski, among others – has managed, at the expense of weakening units fighting in Ukraine, to preserve around 600 modern tanks.
Significant forces are being trained deep within the country and are not engaged in the ongoing conflict. At a decisive moment, they may be deployed to the front or perhaps they are already being prepared with the intention of being used elsewhere after the conclusion of the war in Ukraine.
Four scenarios according to RAND
This is highlighted by the RAND think tank, which outlines four scenarios for rebuilding the Russian armed forces. The first, termed the "Shoigu plan" (named after Sergey Shoigu, Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council), envisages building a larger army than in 2022, but modernising it only "in limited areas," due to the long-term issues faced by the Russian defence sector.
The second scenario entails building a large army equipped with not particularly modern, but mass-produced equipment – which is achievable for Russian industry. The third scenario involves reducing the numerical size of the army, coupled with a technological leap achieved by implementing new, though less numerous, weapon systems.
The fourth option is the restructuring of the army based on a Western model, drawing on patterns from, among others, the organisation of the US Army, supported by external knowledge acquired through cooperation with foreign partners.
What kind of army is Russia building?
The evaluation of these scenarios was discussed in an interview with PAP, among others, by Dr. Jakub Olchowski from the Institute of Central Europe. In his view, predicting the developmental course of the Russian army, due to the numerous variables, is akin to reading tea leaves. Nevertheless, he considered the third and fourth scenarios to be the least likely.
In the expert's opinion, the primary focus should be on the plan to numerically expand the Russian armed forces and the limited – constrained by industrial capabilities – attempt at army modernisation, or the "Shoigu plan."
Meanwhile, as noted on platform X by Konrad Muzyka from the analytical firm Rochan Consulting, "the [Russian] industry will not close the gaps created by the war over the next 10 years. This thesis should be constantly re-evaluated based on production data of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, or Sino-Russian economic cooperation."
It is precisely foreign support that could prove a significant factor changing the landscape of Russian armed forces. A precursor to potential changes is, among others, emerging opinions in Russia about the necessity of modernising artillery and replacing the post-Soviet 152 mm calibre with the "Western" 155 mm calibre, currently being adopted by China.
Regardless of the direction of changes that Russian armed forces will undergo in the coming years, at the start of the next decade, Moscow is likely to have a rebuilt army. This army could significantly differ from the one that, over three years ago, launched a "three-day special operation" only to become ensnared in Ukraine, suffering the greatest losses since World War II.
