Ukraine's nuclear ambitions: Separating fact from fiction

"Kyiv could quickly develop a primitive bomb, similar to the one dropped on Nagasaki in 1945, to deter Russia if the United States cuts off military aid," wrote "The Times" in mid-November.

The British newspaper's article was based on the insights of Oleksiy Izhak, head of the analysis department at Ukraine's National Institute for Strategic Studies. Izhak merely discussed the challenges and potential consequences of a hypothetical revival of Ukraine's nuclear weapons programme.

A few days later, sensational news was reported by "The New York Times." Citing anonymous sources in the White House, the newspaper suggested that before the end of his term, Joe Biden would want to provide Ukraine with nuclear weapons. These reports were denied by Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Advisor.

Both publications and the reactions to them happened to coincide with Russia's announcement of an updated nuclear doctrine. Vladimir Putin announced it on 19 November.

It expands the criteria for the use of nuclear weapons. In this new version, atomic weapons could be used in response to attacks by non-nuclear states (of which Ukraine is currently one) supported by nuclear powers. The use of nuclear weapons is also possible in response to significant attacks using conventional weapons, such as drones or hypersonic weapons. In particular, it emphasises the possibility of responding to threats against the territorial integrity of Russia or its allies, including Belarus.

Kyiv firmly distances itself from the idea of rebuilding its nuclear capabilities. "Ukraine does not intend to create nuclear weapons and will adhere to the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," wrote Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhiy Tykhyi on Telegram.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited over 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons and 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (130 UR-100N ballistic missiles, each capable of carrying six warheads, and 46 RT-23 missiles with 10 warheads each). Kyiv also had 38 heavy strategic bombers.

At that time, it possessed the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Due to Ukraine's uncertain political situation, the West insisted on dismantling this arsenal, and talks on the subject began in 1992.

Opponents of this solution in Ukraine argued that possessing nuclear weapons was a guarantee of maintaining independence and sovereignty. On the other hand, for Kyiv, nuclear weapons were a burden because the control systems remained in Russia, and the costs of maintaining the arsenal significantly strained Ukraine's then-small budget.

After relatively smooth negotiations, the Budapest Memorandum was signed in 1994, which, in exchange for the disposal of the atomic arsenal, guaranteed the maintenance of Ukraine's existing borders' "independence and sovereignty." The signatories committed to not using or threatening to use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. The guarantors were the USA, the UK, and Russia.

The arsenal was to be shipped to the Russian Federation, where the carriers and warheads were dismantled under international supervision. The last warhead was transported to Russia in June 1996.

In 2010, during the nuclear security summit in Washington, Ukraine committed to disposing of highly enriched uranium. The material, totalling approximately 234 kilograms, was transferred to Russia between 2010 and 2012 with the participation of the USA. In this way, Kyiv fulfilled another obligation concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and efforts towards nuclear security.

By annexing Crimea and instigating the conflict in Donbas, Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum. The full-scale war that broke out in 2022 completed the memorandum's breach.

At that time, discussions among Ukrainian politicians were revived about whether it was a mistake to relinquish their atomic weapons. At the beginning of the war, this was mentioned by, among others, Oleksiy Danilov, then Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, who was dismissed in spring 2024. He stated that his country needs an alliance with a nuclear power like the United Kingdom, emphasising the necessity of having an effective defence system in the face of Russian aggression. However, he distanced himself from the idea that Ukraine is considering building nuclear weapons.

Oleksiy Arestovych, former adviser to President Zelensky, was more radical. In 2023, he claimed that creating Ukraine's own nuclear weapons would be feasible. He said, "Obtaining enriched uranium takes some time. But such things happen. You never know where uranium might be. Sometimes you're just walking, and suddenly there's a barrel of uranium lying there."

The removal of highly enriched uranium from Ukraine means that Ukrainians lack the appropriate materials to build an atomic bomb. It's unlikely they'd find a barrel of uranium lying around. However, they do have considerable plutonium resources, although using them may be problematic.

As Pavel Podvig, an expert on arms control and nuclear security at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, noted, "Ukraine has seven tonnes of plutonium, which could be used to build hundreds of warheads. However, all this plutonium is in spent fuel. To extract it, a processing facility is needed, which Ukraine does not have."

There have been suggestions that this is a realistic scenario. Maj. Oleksiy Hetman, a prominent military expert, believes that Ukraine has the technology, specialists, and uranium to create an atomic bomb. He stated, "Two months is quite a realistic scenario." Mariana Budjeryn, a researcher at the Belfer Center at Harvard Kennedy School, argues that Ukraine could carry out a nuclear weapons development programme at the Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research.

These statements are more journalistic than realistic assessments. The cost of the programme, the time needed to build the bomb, and above all, the lack of appropriate delivery systems, would lead to a waste of resources and means necessary for bolstering the armed forces.

Additionally, the Russians would not remain passive, and efforts to establish a nuclear arsenal by Ukraine would undoubtedly meet with a reaction from the Kremlin. The Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research could become a target for Russian attacks, just like the Iranian nuclear weapons research centre Taleghani 2 in Parchin became a target for Israeli bombs.

The idea of building a Ukrainian nuclear warhead, although theoretically possible, remains unrealistic in practice. Zelensky’s words addressed to Donald Trump in October won't change that: "What options do we have? Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons as a defence, or we must join an alliance like NATO." Moreover, the Ukrainian president almost immediately clarified that work on nuclear weapons is not being conducted.