Ukrainian strikes disrupt the Russian command structure again

Since the beginning of the year, Ukrainians have resumed attacks on Russian command centres. On 2 January, rockets struck the command post of a marine brigade in the village of Maryino in the Kursk region. A few days later, the Ukrainian General Staff reported attacks on the command posts of the 8th Combined Arms Army in occupied Khartsyzk in the Donetsk region and the subordinate 3rd Army Corps in occupied Svitlodarsk in the Donetsk region. Then, on 12 January, missiles were reported to have hit the staff of the 2nd Combined Arms Army.

The 2nd Army directs Russian operations south of Pokrovsk, the 3rd Corps operates near Chasiv Yar, and the 8th Army is engaged near Kurakhove. In recent months, these commands have been responsible for actions in the most critical sectors. Approximately 70 percent of all combat engagements occur along the front line, which spans over 1,500 kilometres.

The Ukrainians returned to a tactic from the first year of the war when neutralising command centres and staff caused confusion in the Russian army. Those attacks cut off units fighting near Izyum during the recovery of the Kharkiv region.

Three years ago, Ukrainians effectively paralysed the command system, increasing the chaos prevailing in the opponent's army. The enormous significance of eliminating senior officers for defensive warfare was visible in the Polessian sector, where Ukrainians broke the battalion tactical groups led by colonels. Their deaths caused the offensive to halt entirely. Significant problems arose after eliminating staff in the Izyum and Kherson sectors, especially during attacks on Chornobaivka.

The Kherson airport was attacked at least 18 times. This always occurred when supply helicopters or command staff arrived. In the initial stage of the war, the Russians did not draw any conclusions from this. On 18 March 2022, Lt. Gen. Andrei Mordvichev, commander of the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, was injured in an attack on the airport. On 25 March, Lt. Gen. Yakov Rezantsev, commander of the 49th Combined Arms Army, was killed in a rocket artillery barrage at the airport, along with two colonels.

The death of Major Gen. Vladimir Frolov, the deputy commander of the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, was a significant loss, having been eliminated by a sniper in the spring of 2022 — on 10 March, according to reports. Ukrainians intercepted information that the general would visit a brigade command post. A timely strike was a mere detail, bringing together the collaboration of several elements of the whole system.

However, the most severe loss was the death of Major Gen. Andrei Kolesnikov, the commander of the 29th Combined Arms Army of the Eastern Military District. According to unconfirmed reports, he was eliminated on 11 March, a day after Frolov's death, during a strike on the command post where he was present.

All these strikes significantly impeded Russian advances on the front. Most often, troops deprived of orders from above would halt. Lower-level commanders could not demonstrate initiative and awaited directives; when these did not appear, they preferred not to take risks.

Reapplying methods from the start of the war now could yield even better results. While the Lernaean Hydra would grow two or three equally strong heads in place of each severed one, in the case of the Russian Hydra, only one regrows, which doesn’t necessarily mean it will be as competent. The Russian Hydra is often of poorer quality, so targeting command posts is highly beneficial for Ukrainians. Moreover, it reinforces the notion that Russians cannot feel safe anywhere.

Electronic warfare forces play a significant role in locating command posts and staff. They intercept signals from Russian communications and locate their source. This is facilitated by the persistent issue Russians have had for years with communications, which either function very poorly or not at all. This problem exists at every level, from individual soldier equipment to the strategic level.

Surprisingly, Russians often use unencrypted Chinese-made walkie-talkies, which can be bought in shops. Meanwhile, the Azart radios they spent £194 million on in 2012 are incompatible with market products.

The weakness of Russian electronic warfare systems is best exemplified by the death of Major Gen. Andrei Simonov, commander of the Electronic Warfare Units of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army. He was killed on 29 or 30 April 2022, near Izyum, due to a rocket artillery attack on the army command post. His units were supposed to ensure the security of communication means. They did not perform well.