TechRussia's ambitious Su-75 fighter plan faces skepticism

Russia's ambitious Su‑75 fighter plan faces skepticism

The Director of the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant (KnAAZ), Yuri Kondratyev, has announced that in 2025, Russia will assemble the first two prototypes of the 5th generation Su-75 Checkmate fighter jet. However, the development of the aircraft, first unveiled in 2021 and initially expected to fly in 2023, raises many doubts, especially since the Russian arms industry is already struggling to produce advanced fighter jets, delivering only a few units each year.

Visualisation of Su-75 Checkmate
Visualisation of Su-75 Checkmate
Images source: © Licensor
Karolina Modzelewska

The world first learned of the new 5th generation Su-75 fighter project in 2021, when Russia presented its model at the MAKS 2021 International Aviation and Space Salon. Initially, little information was disclosed about the aircraft's capabilities and specifications. This did not deter Russia from seeking buyers for the "non-existent" fighter, which was intended for both domestic and international markets.

Russia tries to sell a "non-existent" aircraft

Russia primarily counted on India in this regard – offering not only the aircraft but also the chance to participate in its development. However, Delhi, mindful of the issues with the PAK FA programme (the Su-57 fighter construction programme) and the discrepancies over technology transfer and machine specifications, showed little interest in the proposal. India also repeatedly emphasised its focus on its own Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) fighter development programme.

The appeal of the Russian offer was not helped by the fact that, so far, the Kremlin has not built a single Su-75 prototype, although it was initially claimed the aircraft's first flight would occur in 2023, with mass production beginning in 2026. These plans are now outdated. As Yuri Kondratyev has announced, the first two Su-75 prototypes will be completed in 2025, although these declarations also raise many doubts.

Kondratyev explained that one prototype is intended for ground static tests and the other for flight tests. He also emphasised that the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant (KnAAZ), where they are being developed, will also focus on the production of Su-35S and Su-57 fighters in 2025, models actively used by the Russians in Ukraine.

The plans related to the development and production of fighters appear ambitious. However, it is important to note that in 2024, according to data collected and presented by Military Watch Magazine, Russia delivered a total of 14 batches of combat aircraft to its military in various configurations. These included three batches of Su-57, four batches of Su-35, six batches of Su-34, and one batch of Su-30SM, though the exact number of aircraft in each batch remains unknown.

Analyses by the Ukrainian Defense Express service indicate that in 2022 Russia delivered to the military 6 Su-57 fighters, 7 Su-35, 10 Su-34, 4 Su-30SM, and two Yak-130 aircraft. This totals 29 new and upgraded machines. In 2023, estimates suggested deliveries of 26 aircraft, including two Su-57 (with Russian sources reporting 8), 10 Su-35, 6 Su-34, 4 Su-30SM, and 4 Yak-130. The data suggests that Russia can produce around 30 combat and training aircraft even amidst ongoing conflict.

The limitations in Russian production of new combat aircraft are more serious than they might initially appear. While the Kremlin tries to maintain an image of technological independence, the reality is that sanctions imposed on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine have significantly impacted the military industry's capabilities. A major issue is access to advanced electronics, aviation components, and dual-use technologies previously imported from the West.

The problem is not only the availability of key components and the production rate but also quality — the lack of access to modern components affects reliability and combat effectiveness. It is worth noting that the sanctions have cut off Russia from legal supplies of precision integrated circuits, avionics systems, and AESA radar components.

In response, Moscow has tried to develop its substitutes, but the results of these efforts remain limited. Russia also seeks to supplement components obtained from its allies, including those procured through smuggling, with false documentation, or sold as civilian components that are then adapted for military use.

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