TechRussian glide bombs: Ukrainian struggle against Western tech

Russian glide bombs: Ukrainian struggle against Western tech

The Russian KAB glide bombs present a significant challenge for Ukrainians, potentially using Western electronics. Here are the Western electronic components identified by the Ukrainians.

Su-34 pilot observing a flying FAB-3000 bomb with a UMPK module.
Su-34 pilot observing a flying FAB-3000 bomb with a UMPK module.
Images source: © Russian mon
Przemysław Juraszek

Despite imposed sanctions, Russia continues to import Western technology crucial for producing glide bombs, as reported in "The Makers of Ruin: Glide Bombs, UMPK, and Their Civilian Cost", prepared by the NAKO (Independent Anti-Corruption Commission).

The KAB bombs are developed by equipping outdated unguided FAB aircraft bombs with UMPK modules (Unified Set of Planning and Correction Modules). These are essentially a replica of the American JDAM-ER bombs. Unfortunately, they are a very effective weapon, capable of delivering hundreds of pounds of explosives with an accuracy of less than 33 feet. Initial versions had a range of 37-43 miles, but new PD variants with larger wings allow targeting at distances up to 56 miles.

Western electronics found in Russian bombs

The most critical components of the UMPK module are the Kometa guidance module and the control unit for the bomb's control surfaces. Western components form the core of the Kometa modules, which guide using GLONASS/GPS or Beidou systems.

This includes ceramic antennas from the Irish company Taoglas, which play a vital role in capturing GPS signals and providing a basis for determining position and time in the system. Additionally, Altera's FPGA chips, owned by Intel, function as the brains of the Kometa module, used for signal processing and filtering, and controlling the functions of the entire system.

It's notable that receivers from the Swiss company u-blox improve the quality of the received signal, and temperature sensors from the American company Analog Devices enhance the stability of the complete module under various conditions. Overall, the Ukrainians identified 10 components from companies in the USA, four from Switzerland, and two each from Ireland and Japan, excluding components of Chinese origin.

Russian access to key electronics

Despite being cut off from military electronics, Russia still accesses civilian systems that can be used in weapons manufacturing. There are cases where Russians dismantle household appliances to retrieve suitable components, and several companies around the globe are willing to sell electronics to Russia at higher prices. An example involves companies from Kazakhstan.

The situation is further complicated by the widespread availability of many items on the open market, making it difficult to block them. Over 82% of identified electronics exporters to Russia are companies registered in China or Hong Kong. Sanctions loopholes are problematic as well since, out of the 26 Russian entities linked to KAB production, only JSC Tactical Missiles is on the sanctions list of all potential Western countries.

Ukrainians are the most effective at blocking exports to Russian firms, covering 85% of companies, with the USA following closely with a success rate of 73%. Switzerland and Germany have sanctioned 50% of firms linked to UMPK module production, while the United Kingdom has sanctioned only 7%. It is likely that Russia, similar to Iran, will create more new entities that appear outside the scope of sanctions.

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