US and the new nuclear race: Shifting global alliances
Instead of depending on declarations from Washington, the current allies of the USA might start seeking security guarantees through their own nuclear weapons. On the shortlist of countries capable of pursuing such security, according to American experts.
The credibility of the United States and the security guarantees provided by Washington for decades have prevented American allies from attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. This was in line with the long-term policy of major powers, which aimed to maximize the limitation of the spread (proliferation) of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.
Formally, this was secured by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which came into force in 1970, when China, France, the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom already possessed such weapons. Almost the entire planet joined the treaty; by 2003, it was signed by 189 countries.
Israel, India, North Korea (with the exception of 1985-2003), Pakistan, and South Sudan remained outside the treaty. All of them, except for Sudan, possess nuclear weapons.
Crisis of trust
According to officials from the American administration, contacted by the Defense One service, this situation may soon start to change. The reason is the loss of credibility by the United States and the belief that Donald Trump might abandon existing security commitments.
"Nuclear weapons have no place in the modern world, thus there is no justification for nuclear weapon proliferation, testing and stockpiling," states Defense One.
Countries interested in nuclear capabilities
According to the American administration, which countries are capable of starting their own nuclear programs? The list includes Germany and Poland, as well as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia.
According to Americans, in the case of developed countries with scientific-research backgrounds and industrial bases, the time from making the decision to developing nuclear weapons could now be reduced to just a year.
Not all commentators agree with the opinion on the possibility of such a rapid entry into the nuclear club, yet it remains a fact that countries with developed civilian nuclear energy sectors, like South Korea or Japan, are capable of developing weapons quickly. In such situations, a much greater challenge seems to be not the construction of the nuclear weapon itself, but finding the appropriate means of delivery.
Also, in this case, the pace can surprise, as South Korea already possesses a complete nuclear triad. These are delivery systems based on land (ballistic missiles, such as Hyunmoo-5), sea (KSS-III type vessels with ballistic missiles), and air launches (the airborne variant of the Hyunmoo-3 cruise missile or the Cheonryong missile). It only lacks a nuclear warhead.
Who will start the chain reaction?
To start an equivalent chain reaction, it would be enough for one country to break from the current agreement and announce possession of nuclear weapons or the commencement of its own nuclear program. According to Defense One sources, the initiation of a nuclear program by South Korea, for example, would suffice for Japan to respond with the same declaration.
This could initiate an arms race, where subsequent countries begin to treat nuclear weapons as a security policy more reliable than American promises.
Although developing nuclear weapons and then maintaining an arsenal is not cheap — in France's case, it absorbs about $7-8 billion annually — this amount is not outside the reach of potential interested parties.
Destruction of Moscow as a deterrent
Especially since new members of the nuclear club do not necessarily have to build gigantic arsenals. The United States built its deterrence capability on massive nuclear armaments. Their arsenal can — theoretically — almost entirely destroy Russian military potential, including land-based nuclear weapons and command centres.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom and France adopted different assumptions. The purpose of their nuclear deterrence is not the threat of destroying Russia's nuclear arsenal, but imposing a loss so severe that any potential attack stops being worthwhile. In practice, this means striking not at military targets but at Moscow and possibly another main centre of the country.
It is worth noting that France, besides strategic ballistic missiles carried by submarines, also possesses weapons that allow for using nuclear weapons at a lower level. Air-launched ASMP-A cruise missiles can — according to French doctrine — be used not only as strategic weapons.
The French doctrine even foresees the possibility of a "de-escalatory" attack — a preemptive nuclear strike designed to discourage an enemy from taking aggressive actions and convince them of Paris's determination, which will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons.
Pretenders to join the nuclear club might choose a similar path. As Defense One concludes: If South Korea, Poland, or Saudi Arabia were to cross the threshold, it is hard to believe that the Treaty could survive.
