Weaponry control: Are American arms deals too risky?
Occasionally, the issue of "source codes" comes up again, much like a boomerang. These codes are alleged to be installed in various forms by manufacturers into their weapons systems, and owning countries view them as a means of leverage over buyers.
Recently, this topic has resurfaced under a new name: the kill switch. This is related to the evolving political landscape: the new U.S. administration began threatening sanctions against Canada, Mexico, and the European Union, and temporarily halted military aid to Ukraine.
As a result, experts in many countries started questioning the prudence of purchasing American weapons: if the U.S. is not a 100% reliable partner, should alternatives be sought? In Germany, for example, criticism of the purchase of F-35 fighter jets surfaced once again (Germany bought 35 aircraft for $8.3 billion CAD in 2022), while in Poland, in one interview, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence Mariusz Błaszczak sparked a discussion about whether the Americans might "switch off" the HIMARS system. This is all related to the so-called source codes in weaponry.
What are source codes?
The famous "source codes" are simply a textual record of software content. Based on this code, a computer – such as a mission or fire control system – produces output code, a set of available commands. The same applies to a smartphone, washing machine, or modern car. In the case of weapons systems, it allows for managing weapon systems, making source code critically crucial for both the manufacturer and the user.
The source code stores information like the ability to equip an F-16 or F-35 with bombs and missiles, typically of American production. If equivalents were designed in Canada, without the aircraft manufacturer's consent, it wouldn’t be possible to equip them with domestic weapon systems unless, like the Turks, significant effort was put into bypassing these restrictions. This situation is similar to aircraft and other systems from French, Italian, or European manufacturers. Therefore, the source code does not necessarily disable the system used by a rebellious user. Are there other options?
"Switching off" the F-35
As mentioned earlier, in Germany and elsewhere, a debate has arisen about whether purchasing the F-35 (and American weapons in general) is secure, and whether Washington perceives Germany or the European Union as a competitor, might disable them somehow. Of course, no official confirmation exists.
Lieutenant Colonel Łukasz Treder, from the team responsible for implementing the F-35 aircraft into the Polish Armed Forces, commented that "one should ask whether the administrator of a very complex IT system would be able to embed any jumps/conditional instructions (in a low-level programming language) that could later be activated at the aircraft's software operation level."
This somewhat enigmatic answer highlights the essence of the problem: until there is evidence of a grounded fleet of F-35s or other systems halted for unknown reasons, we will remain uncertain. This applies to systems like Rafale, HIMARS, and air defence units like Patriots or IRIS, not just American aircraft.
Comparable solutions are openly known from the less sensitive civilian market. For instance, in 2023, a scandal emerged linked to the Newag firm, which remotely disabled its trains if owners serviced them elsewhere. Similar cases occur in the automotive market. There are also vague reports about how American SM-2 anti-aircraft missiles from the German frigate Hessen "accidentally" missed an American MQ-9 Reaper drone that Germany mistargeted.
On the opposing side, officials from Belgium and Switzerland officially deny the existence of a physical "switch." The aircraft manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, also refuted the reports. Therefore, the answer should be: we don’t know, but if the manufacturer sees fit to introduce restrictions, it will do so. This doesn’t have to mean literally switching off aircraft or missiles right away.
How to navigate without GPS?
An intermediate option might be cutting off a subscriber from the GPS signal. Only a few satellite navigation systems exist, and the most popular is the American GPS, used in navigation and guiding precision weaponry.
However, Lieutenant Colonel Treder points out that "we must remember that its primary form [of the navigation system - ed.] is jamming-resistant inertial navigation, which measures accelerations and angular velocities to determine the object's orientation and position". He added that "GPS helps reduce our measurement error; jamming its signal or spoofing attacks can affect the precision of delivery systems, which is why anti-jam receivers, e.g., by Collins Aerospace on the F-35 aircraft, are installed."
Various companies also strive to bypass GPS by developing precise navigation systems independent of it. Furthermore, Lieutenant Colonel Treder assures: "please believe me that pilots can safely return home without GPS". The problem could be missile guidance, which, without GPS, would become as valuable in combat as unguided counterparts, although they would still be much more expensive.
Other options
Indeed, manufacturers retain some control over their products. Regarding the F-35, according to the F-35 programme support unit, foreign operators "do not have the right to conduct independent test operations outside continental U.S. territory in line with U.S. policy" and "U.S. government security policies require U.S. citizens to perform specific functions to protect critical solutions." This means strict U.S. control over the advanced solutions used in the F-35 (the only exception being Israel, which can operate its F-35Is independently). However, this is not a "switch," but merely a "safety valve" in case someone decides to integrate the F-35 with unwanted systems.
Another possibility is the Mission Data File (MDF) archive. It allows execution of key functions such as charting flight paths with reduced detectability, managing communications, or specific mission aspects. Without MDF updates, the combat effectiveness of the F-35 would quickly decrease.
The real leverage is something more mundane than the alleged ability to disconnect a selected part of the F-35 fleet (or another weapon system) via a "red button." In essence, it's enough to cut off the fleet from service support.
Modern fighting systems are highly complex. Each tank, self-propelled gun, drone, ship, and aircraft consists of numerous complex and often electronically controlled components with specific lifespans. The manufacturer typically retains a large degree of control over these aspects (though rarely completely). In the U.S., some components supplied by their firms must be serviced only in designated facilities, and maintenance knowledge is not shared beyond their walls.
In other words, cutting off the user of an imported weapon system from service support would severely limit the operational capability of the owned fleet within months at the latest. Of course, cannibalisation or acquiring spare parts clandestinely would extend the fleet's lifespan (as seen with Iranian F-14s), but this would merely postpone the inevitable.
Thus, neither the Americans, the French, the Germans, nor other leading weapon manufacturers need to resort to installing "emergency plugs" in their most advanced systems.
