Trump's military budget shuffle: More funds amid cuts and controversies

Donald Trump’s presidency's first 100 days are marked not only by chaos in global trade or international relations but also by new challenges faced by the US Department of Defence in the first months of 2025.

Its current head, Pete Hagseth, is an officer with combat experience from Iraq and Afghanistan. The balance of his work so far indicates that achievements on the battlefield do not necessarily translate into the ability to manage large structures or competencies regarding the confidentiality and protection of sensitive information.

As early as February, Donald Trump ordered an eight per cent reduction in the Pentagon's budget. The significant budget cut was intended to be a cyclical measure – in subsequent years, the amount spent on the American armed forces was to decrease by another eight per cent.

The savings were to bypass spending related to the American presence in the Far East and the Pacific, but these plans raised doubts about the future of programmes such as NGAD (F-47 aircraft), the development of hypersonic weapons (such as HALO missiles) or new strategic nuclear deterrents.

Shortly after these announcements, which led to preparations by the Department of Defence including mass layoffs, Pete Hagseth announced an increase in the Pentagon’s budget from the current $886 billion to a trillion dollars (£663 billion to £750 billion).

The Pentagon chief's declarations are accompanied by an initiative from Republican congressmen proposing an additional $150 (£112) billion for the army. In practice, this means that—despite the declared budget cuts for the armed forces—the Pentagon could be flooded with an unprecedented flow of money. Which areas are prioritised for the current administration?

The idea of building the Golden Dome – a new generation missile defence shield – in its name refers to the Israeli Iron Dome defence system, but in terms of its mode of operation, it is more akin to Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative, commonly known as "Star Wars".

The Golden Dome is intended to ensure the security of the United States by defending not specific points or theatres of operation, as previous systems have done, but the entire US territory and potentially American allies. The means to build such a defence are the militarisation of near space—placing both sensors, which detect and track potential threats, and effectors—weapons designed to counter detected missiles—in orbit.

In terms of scale, the Golden Dome initiative seems to have no counterparts in the past—launching a defence system with the intended capabilities may require placing thousands of satellites in space, and the cost of building and maintaining it over many years means spending hundreds of billions of dollars.

Among other things, this is why, in the context of building the Golden Dome, Elon Musk proposed missile defence as a service offered by private entities on a subscription basis. This idea sparked numerous comments and controversies regarding the risk of handing over control of critical infrastructure to private entities and the commercialisation of national security.

American military aviation also requires funding. It is an area where the Pentagon has had, over the last 30 years—due to its technical superiority—a decisive advantage over the rest of the world. However, in the context of the development of Chinese aviation, this advantage is increasingly questioned, and the Air Force is struggling with serious, systemic problems.

The number of airworthy aircraft is decreasing year by year, the average age of the machines remains close to the symbolic threshold of 30 years, and the improvement in this indicator in recent years is not due to a massive influx of new aircraft into the USAF but to the scale of retiring older constructions. The production of new ones—primarily F-35s—does not cover the current and planned future losses.

At the same time, military aviation suffers from an increasingly acute lack of personnel—there is a shortage of pilots. Currently, the number of vacancies reaches 2,000. To slightly improve the situation, the Air Force has started, among other things, to change height restrictions for potential candidates.

In this context, the threat to the NGAD programme, recently signalled in connection with the projected costs of future sixth-generation combat aircraft, seemed quite real. Despite the costs, however, the new machine will be developed, as announced by Donald Trump, who also disclosed its planned designation—F-47.

Another area that the current administration seems to prioritise is enhancing the capabilities of the American navy. The concept itself is not Trump’s initiative—for more than a decade, various analyses and commanders at different levels have pointed out systemic problems with the American fleet, but little has resulted from this.

The American navy is a cornerstone of the current world order—it guarantees the freedom of navigation and trade exchange by sea. The seriousness with which this issue is treated is vividly demonstrated by Donald Trump's actions regarding control over the Panama Canal and the campaign against the Houthis, who pose a threat to shipping lanes in the Red Sea.

The global dispersion of the US Navy means that in the event of a potential conflict with China, the Pentagon might lack the forces for a victorious confrontation in the Pacific.

Therefore, additional funds are to be allocated to, among other things, the expansion of the American fleet (continuation of the Littoral Combat Ship programme, speeding up the construction of modern frigates and guided missile destroyers), as well as building (or rather rebuilding) the capabilities of the American shipbuilding industry.

The high priority placed on strengthening the American naval potential calls into question the AUKUS agreement (the agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, whose central pillar is the provision of nuclear submarines to Australia).

During a Senate hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defence Elbridge Colby stated that if providing Australia with new submarines would limit US Navy capabilities, the submarines would not be delivered.

Given the pace of retiring older submarines and the production capacities of the American industry, simply maintaining (without the planned increase) the capabilities of the American submarine fleet requires delivering an average of 2.3 Virginia-class submarines per year.

Currently, US capacity in this regard is 1.2 submarines per year. Without quickly boosting production capacity, the potential of the American navy will decline, and the strategic AUKUS agreement may be challenged.