Return of Trump intensifies US‑Iran tensions with bold stance

During his first term, Donald Trump pursued a markedly anti-Iranian foreign policy. In 2018, he withdrew from the nuclear agreement with Iran, calling it the “worst deal in history,” and subsequently imposed harsh sanctions on every sector of the Iranian economy. Simultaneously, the Trump administration threatened EU member states, Russia, and China with so-called secondary sanctions if they continued trading with Iran.

The policy, termed the “maximum pressure policy” by the Trump administration, severely impacted the Iranian economy but failed to achieve its goal of forcing Iran to negotiate a new agreement. An agreement that would not only address Iran’s nuclear activities but also regulate issues such as Iran’s ballistic missile programme and the pro-Iranian network of militias operating in the Middle East, known as the Axis of Resistance.

President Biden’s administration attempted to reset relations with Iran and return to the nuclear agreement but did not succeed. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Biden’s team quietly allowed Iran to increase oil exports to protect global markets from rising oil prices.

As a result, in the summer of 2024, Iranian oil exports reached around 270,000 cubic metres per day, the highest level since the US withdrew from the nuclear agreement. It’s no surprise that Trump’s associates have harshly criticised the outgoing administration, labelling Biden’s policy towards Iran as “appeasement.”

Signals from the president-elect’s camp indicate that when Donald Trump returns to the White House in January 2025, he will resume the “maximum pressure policy” against Iran from his first term. However, since this approach did not work previously, it is hard to expect it to be effective now.

This is especially true since Iran’s international situation has significantly changed. Therefore, a “course correction” may be necessary, opting for bolder steps and not excluding the use of military forces—but not necessarily American ones. In the Middle East, there is one US ally who would willingly undertake this “dirty work” (i.e., an attack on Iran).

During Donald Trump’s first term, the US discouraged Russia and China from trading with Iran by threatening so-called secondary sanctions on Russian and Chinese companies. However, this time, Trump's team might face more resistance, especially from Russia.

The war in Ukraine has altered Moscow's approach to Iran. Previously, Russia, not wanting to enter into conflict with the USA, withdrew from most economic projects in Iran. Now that Russia is under sanctions, Russian-Iranian economic cooperation is thriving, evidenced by deliveries of Iranian arms to Russia or Russian investments in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects Russia, through Iran, with India. As long as the war in Ukraine continues and Moscow remains under sanctions, Russia will not scale back its contact with Iran.

Similarly, it will be challenging to compel China to limit its trade with Iran, especially since 90% of Iran's oil exports go to China (approximately 240,000 cubic metres per day).

Unlike in 2018, currently, Iranian oil is purchased not by large Chinese state-owned enterprises but by small, private refineries—known as “teapot refineries”—which trade with Iran in the Chinese currency, thereby bypassing American sanctions.

Iran’s relationships with Russia and China are therefore much stronger now than in 2018, when Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement. However, every situation has two sides. In this case, Trump may count on an unexpected ally, the European Union.

In 2018, EU member states criticised the withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran, but the situation is now quite different. Due to military support that Iran provided to Putin in his aggression against Ukraine, the EU will most likely side with Trump in the forthcoming confrontation with Iran. EU support could have significant implications. In Washington, there is consideration of using EU countries to trigger the so-called “snapback mechanism” to reinstate sanctions previously imposed by the UN on Iran before the nuclear agreement.

Trump also benefits from Iran’s diminished role in the Middle East and the failures that the pro-Iranian Axis of Resistance has suffered recently in its confrontations with Israel. The political and military leadership of Hamas has been eliminated, most Hamas units have been crushed, and the Gaza Strip is completely devastated.

The Lebanese Hezbollah has also received several powerful setbacks: the organisation’s leadership (headed by Hassan Nasrallah) has been removed, part of the missile arsenal destroyed, and thousands of fighters killed. An even greater blow for the Iranians was the loss of their Syrian ally, Bashar al-Assad, without whom Iran has lost a direct connection to Lebanon and Hezbollah.

After more than a year of struggles with Israel, only a memory remains of the former power of the Axis of Resistance. Currently, Iran can only rely on Shiite militias in Iraq and Yemeni Houthis. Worse yet, the failures of the Axis of Resistance and Israel’s victories have greatly strengthened Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position, who—according to some Israeli media—is already preparing for a military strike on Iran's nuclear programme.

According to Donald Trump’s associates, the president-elect is still developing his strategy towards Iran. Their statements suggest that the goal—akin to 2018—will be to reach a new agreement with Iran, not to overthrow the Islamic Republic. The basis of Trump’s strategy will be a return to the "maximum pressure policy," but—unlike in 2018—this time Trump intends to focus more on military aspects and a direct strike on Iran’s nuclear programme.

Statements from Donald Trump's associates suggest that the president-elect does not intend to use American military forces against Iran. Trump favours a scenario where Americans provide strong support to Israel, and the Israeli air force conducts strikes on facilities involved in the Iranian nuclear programme.

Prime Minister Netanyahu would certainly welcome such a plan. Following the recent defeats that Israel inflicted on the pro-Iranian Axis of Resistance, Netanyahu is determined to finally address the issue of the Islamic Republic.

However, an Israeli attack on Iranian research facilities carries significant risks. Part of Iran’s nuclear programme is conducted in underground facilities, which might survive an Israeli attack. In such a scenario, Iran would likely lose all restraint and attempt to construct nuclear weapons.

Therefore, paradoxically, Trump’s and Netanyahu’s policy could lead to the very scenario it aims to prevent—a “nuclear-armed Iran.”