South Korea and others reconsider nuclear options amid US doubts
Instead of relying on declarations from Washington, the current allies of the USA may begin seeking security guarantees through their own nuclear weapons. On the shortlist of countries capable of pursuing such security measures, according to American experts.
The credibility of the United States and the security guarantees provided by Washington for decades have prevented American allies from attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. This aligns with the long-term policy of major powers, aimed at maximising the limitation of the spread (proliferation) of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.
Formally, this was secured by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which came into force in 1970, when China, France, the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom already possessed such weapons. Almost the entire world joined the treaty—by 2003, it was signed by 189 countries.
Israel, India, North Korea (except for the period 1985-2003), Pakistan, and South Sudan remained outside the treaty. All of them—except Sudan—possess nuclear weapons.
Crisis of trust
According to officials from the American administration, contacted by the Defence One service, this situation may soon start to change. The reason is the loss of credibility by the United States and the belief that Donald Trump might abandon existing security commitments.
Nuclear weapons have no place in the modern world, thus there is no justification for nuclear weapon proliferation, testing and stockpiling, states Defence One.
Countries interested in nuclear capabilities
According to the American administration, which countries are capable of starting their own nuclear programmes? The list includes Germany and Poland, as well as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia.
According to American sources, in the case of developed countries with a scientific-research background and industrial base, the time from making the decision to developing nuclear weapons could now be reduced to just a year.
Not all commentators agree with the opinion on the possibility of such a rapid entry into the nuclear club, yet it remains a fact that countries with developed civilian nuclear energy sectors—like South Korea or Japan—are capable of developing weapons quickly. In such a situation, a much greater challenge seems to be not the construction of the nuclear weapon itself, but the appropriate means of delivery.
Also in this case, the pace can surprise, as South Korea already possesses a complete nuclear triad. These are delivery systems based on land (ballistic missiles, such as Hyunmoo-5), sea (KSS-III type vessels with ballistic missiles), and launched from the air (the airborne variant of the Hyunmoo-3 cruise missile or the Cheonryong missile). It only lacks a nuclear warhead.
Who will start the chain reaction?
To start an equivalent chain reaction, it is enough for one country to break from the current agreement and announce possession of nuclear weapons or the commencement of its own nuclear programme. According to Defence One sources, the initiation of a nuclear programme, for example, by South Korea, would suffice for Japan to respond with the same declaration.
This could initiate an arms race, in which subsequent countries begin to treat nuclear weapons as a security policy more reliable than American promises.
Although developing nuclear weapons and then maintaining a nuclear arsenal is not cheap—in the case of France, it absorbs about €6.5-7.5 billion annually, this amount is not beyond the reach of potential interested parties.
Destruction of Moscow as a deterrent
Especially since new members of the nuclear club do not necessarily have to build gigantic arsenals. The United States built its deterrence capability on massive nuclear armaments. Their arsenal can—theoretically—almost entirely destroy Russian military potential, including land-based nuclear weapons and command centres.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom and France adopted entirely different assumptions. The purpose of their nuclear deterrence is not the threat of destroying Russia's nuclear arsenal, but imposing a loss so severe that any potential attack from it ceases to be worthwhile. In practice, this means striking not at military targets, but at Moscow and, possibly, another major centre of the country.
It is worth noting that France—besides strategic ballistic missiles carried by submarines, also possesses weapons that allow for using nuclear weapons at a lower level. Air-launched ASMP-A cruise missiles can—according to the French doctrine—be used not only as strategic weapons.
The French doctrine even foresees the possibility of a "de-escalatory" attack—a preemptive nuclear strike, designed to discourage an enemy from taking aggressive actions and convince them of Paris's determination, which will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons.
Pretenders to join the nuclear club might choose a similar path. As Defence One concludes: If South Korea, Poland, or Saudi Arabia were to cross the threshold, it is hard to believe that the Treaty could survive.
