Ukraine adopts Mossad-style tactics against Russian leaders

Eliminating enemy commanders has a long history. During World War II, the Home Army conducted an assassination attempt on Franz Kutschera, the SS and police commander for the Warsaw district of the General Government, and Czechoslovak commandos killed the protector of Bohemia and Moravia, Reinhard Heydrich.

Although such operations raised moral doubts—Prime Minister Winston Churchill, for instance, considered assassinations of military and political leaders unethical—they became an important tool of warfare, weighing gains against losses, including German retaliatory actions against civilians.

In the case of Ukrainian actions, assassinations of senior Russian officers are a retaliatory measure against individuals suspected of conducting or directing attacks on civilians. Some assassinations, like the one carried out with a hammer on Colonel Dmitriy Golenko, chief of staff of the 52nd heavy bomber regiment responsible for planning bombing raids on Ukrainian cities, have stirred considerable controversy.

Not only due to the manner in which the assassination was carried out, but also the potential violation of the law. International experts have noted that if the assassins managed to get so close, they could have kidnapped him, "taken him to Kyiv, and put him on trial instead of committing murder."

Similar operations have recently been conducted by Israel's Mossad, eliminating Hezbollah members using explosive devices hidden in pagers. This series of assassinations resulted in a significant—though not primarily intended—propaganda effect. In the case of the Ukrainian action, the image effect in the West was contrary to what was expected. However, image losses were not the most crucial aspect here.

“If someone in a command position is eliminated, who has not only real influence over ongoing military operations but also a high level of competence, it is a significant loss for the Russian side,” notes Dr. Dariusz Materniak, a Polish expert on Eastern affairs. “It's important to remember that these are usually officers with long service time, thus substantial combat experience, not only from the war with Ukraine but also from operations that Russia has conducted elsewhere. Replacing someone in a similar position with an equally competent individual is much more challenging because such people are usually scarce, even in an army as expansive as Russia's.”

“Especially since the Russian army has already suffered significant losses of senior officers at the level of colonel and above during the war with Ukraine, particularly in 2022—this has and will continue to have a negative impact on Russian capabilities at the operational and strategic levels,” notes the expert.

The Russians have a very serious problem with a lack of command personnel. To date, over 4,300 officers of the Russian army, the National Guard, and other security forces have been confirmed dead. As many as 467 held the rank of lieutenant colonel and above, including eight generals. As many as 57 senior officers, including two generals, have died in just the past six months.

Dr. Michał Piekarski, a security expert from the University of Wrocław, Poland, notes another important aspect.

“The psychological factor is extremely significant,” he notes. “Ukraine has shown that it can reach Russian perpetrators even in the capital of the country. Secondly, the Russians will have to further strengthen the protection of their generals, their facilities in Moscow and other parts of the country, and thus allocate personnel there who will not be performing other tasks at that time.”

Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz, a former NATO Joint Force Training Centre legal adviser specialising in the law of armed conflicts and legal aspects of military operations, shares a similar view.

“This contributes to spreading fear among the Russian 'elite' and also signifies a failure of Russian counterintelligence. But a real impact on military operations could have been the elimination of, for example, the Chief of the General Staff or one of the operational front commanders, as we saw at the beginning of the aggression when Russian generals disregarded OPSEC and INFOSEC requirements, i.e., operational and information security, relatively easily allowing themselves to be 'located' by American intelligence,” explains the officer.

“However, in this case, the Russians evidently drew conclusions, and we no longer observe such spectacular 'failures' on the front. It's different in the deep rear, where it's easier to fall under the illusion of security because they are 'at home'. Paradoxically, it is easier for Ukrainian special services to carry out such assassinations precisely in the depth of Russian territory than in the front zone,” he notes.

So far, in the deep rear, Ukrainians have eliminated Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov and his aide, Maj. Ilya Polikarpov, Lt. Col. Dmitriy Golenko, and Lt. Cmdr. Stanislav Rzhitsky. The loss of Lt. Gen. Kirillov may be particularly painful. He was the commander of the Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defence Troops of the Russian Federation. Commanding a type of weapon, he had already been censured for conducting attacks with prohibited substances.

In early May, the U.S. State Department accused the Russian Federation of violating the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. The use of chemical gas was “probably caused by the desire to displace Ukrainian forces from fortified positions and achieve tactical benefits on the battlefield,” the State Department said in a statement.

In connection with the death of Kirillov, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation initiated a criminal case under articles of the Russian Federation Criminal Code regarding terrorism, calling Ukrainian actions state terrorism. However, experts note that the categorisation of the issue is more complex.

“Neither terrorism nor the elimination of criminals,” explains Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz. “It is the elimination of enemy combatants using controversial methods. For them to be considered war criminals, they would have to be convicted. But Ukraine does not have the right to adjudicate or apply the death penalty, even in wartime, as it is a party to the Optional Protocol XIII to the European Convention on Human Rights.”

Similarly, Dr. Piekarski, whose research area includes terrorism, believes.

“This is not state terrorism,” he emphasises firmly. “The intended target was a soldier, although the method was unusual, but during war, such actions are permissible, especially against people holding high positions in the opponent's armed forces.”

Igor Kirillov was killed on 17 December 2024 in Moscow as a result of a bombing. The explosive device was hidden in an electric scooter standing in front of the entrance to the building on Ryazansky Avenue, where the general lived.

"The Times" called the assassination of the general "a legitimate act of defence". Dmitry Medvedev responded personally to this. The former president and prime minister of Russia, and now deputy chairman of the Security Council, stated: "Be careful! Many things happen in London...".

The Russian Federal Security Service announced on 18 December that it had detained a suspect who allegedly carried out the attack. The FSB claims that the alleged perpetrator is a 29-year-old Uzbek citizen. Russian media emphasise that the man was reportedly recruited by Ukrainian special services. In exchange, he was supposed to receive 100,000 dollars (95,000 euros) and a guarantee of residence in one of the European Union countries.

So far, however, no evidence has been presented, and the pace of FSB's actions has been regarded as astonishingly quick. Especially since in previous cases, they performed very poorly, both in investigations after attacks and counterintelligence protection. Ukrainian intelligence also doesn't have much trouble identifying targets.

“Certainly, people in the highest command positions, playing an important role in the command system, are a high priority for the Ukrainian side,” says Dr. Materniak.

Even before the death of Lt. Col. Dmitriy Golenko, whose body was found in October in the village of Suponyevo near Bryansk, Ukrainians published a list of names and places of residence of regimental officers accused of terrorist attacks.

“In the case of officers, target identification is relatively easy, even based on open-source data. Personal data of high-ranking officers in prominent positions are often published officially, even despite ongoing war. The problem is more the selection of the place and time of the attack, as this requires tedious intelligence work, such as establishing behaviour patterns, habits, customary routes between home and service location,” adds Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz.

“Much depends on the 'assets' Ukrainian intelligence has in the given location, in the surroundings of this or that officer, but probably also on how aware such a person is of the threat, whether and what security measures they undertake,” notes Dr. Materniak.

The complexity of the work that intelligence must perform results in attacks on major officers not being very frequent.

“Preparations for such attacks must have taken many weeks, if not months, but here, too, in a way the victims of these attacks 'helped' Ukrainian services,” concludes Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz. “Routine kills.”