Russia's modern military vision: Post-Ukraine transformation
The war in Ukraine serves as yet another testing ground for Moscow—following Chechnya and Georgia—providing an opportunity to assess the quality of the Russian army. The armed forces that Russia will develop in the coming years might significantly differ from those currently engaged in Ukraine. What can we anticipate in the coming years?
When will Russia be ready for another attack? The publicized analyses of Danish intelligence have had a significant impact, suggesting that Russia could regain the capability to attack NATO about five years after the conclusion of the war in Ukraine.
Similar timelines are provided by experts from Poland, such as Reserve Colonel Maciej Korowaj, German intelligence (end of the current decade), or Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, General Carsten Breuer (2029). American intelligence and Reserve Major Michal Fiszer offer slightly shorter estimates, indicating Russia's readiness to attack as early as 2028.
These assessments usually come with the caveat that readiness to attack does not automatically mean the start of a war.
Moscow's expansionist ambitions may be curtailed by the rebuilding of Western military potential—the same potential that effectively deterred the USSR and the entire Eastern Bloc for half a century during the Cold War from implementing scenarios like "in seven days to the river Rhine," or other attack variants on the West.
Rebuilding of the training system
Russia—despite the significant losses suffered over the past three years—remains capable of rapidly rebuilding its potential. Its capabilities are clearly demonstrated by the current situation in Ukraine: the waves of poorly trained and poorly equipped Russian soldiers, often referred to as "mobiks," belong to the distant past.
Although media reports on the largest spring conscription for the Russian army in years, the current initiative at the front was achieved by the Russians without the involvement of conscripts. Professional soldiers and volunteers who signed contracts are fighting in Russian units in Ukraine. Conscripts are only involved in operations within Russia—in the Kursk and Belgorod regions—where, according to Russian terminology, an anti-terrorist operation is underway.
Moreover, the reestablished training system, after decades of decline, means that—according to assessments by Reserve Colonel Piotr Lewandowski, among others—the Russian soldiers currently deployed to the front are, statistically, better trained than their Ukrainian counterparts.
Where did 600 Russian tanks go?
The reactivation of the training system is complemented by the surprisingly high resilience of the Russian industry, compared to forecasts from two years ago. Yes, mobilization warehouses are already emptying, and at the current rate of losses, Russia will soon lose—in some equipment categories—the ability to replenish them.
Strategic aviation, the navy, and certain types of anti-aircraft systems are in an increasingly poor state. Over time, their condition may deteriorate further.
Nevertheless, Russia—according to civilian analyst Jaroslaw Wolski, among others—has managed, at the cost of weakening units fighting in Ukraine, to preserve about 600 modern tanks.
Substantial forces are being trained deep within the country and are not involved in the current fight. At a decisive moment, they may be deployed to the front, or they may already be prepared for use elsewhere after the end of the war in Ukraine.
Four scenarios according to RAND
This is highlighted by the RAND think tank, which outlines four scenarios for rebuilding Russian armed forces. The first one—called the "Shoigu plan" (after Sergey Shoigu, Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council)—envisions building a larger army than in 2022, while modernizing it "in limited areas" due to long-term problems faced by the Russian defense sector.
The second scenario involves building a large army equipped with not very modern, but mass-produced equipment, which is attainable by Russian industry. The third scenario foresees a numerical reduction of the army, accompanied by a technological leap, resulting from the implementation of new, albeit less numerous, weapon systems.
The fourth variant is the restructuring of the army based on a Western model, using practices drawn from, among others, the organization of the U.S. Army, supported by external knowledge acquired through cooperation with foreign partners.
What army is Russia building?
The assessment of these scenarios was discussed in an interview with PAP by Dr. Jakub Olchowski from the Institute of Central Europe. In his opinion, predicting the development direction of the Russian army, due to the numerous variables, resembles reading tea leaves. At the same time, he deemed the third and fourth scenarios the least likely.
In the expert's estimation, the primary focus should be on the plan to numerically expand Russian armed forces and the limited—constrained by industrial capabilities—attempt at army modernization, or the "Shoigu plan."
At the same time, as noted on platform X by Konrad Muzyka from the analytical firm Rochan Consulting, "the [Russian] industry will not fill the gaps formed as a result of the war in the next 10 years, this thesis must be constantly verified based on production data of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, or Sino-Russian economic cooperation."
It is precisely foreign support that may prove to be a factor that significantly alters the face of Russian armed forces. A sign of possible changes is, among others, emerging opinions in Russia about the need to modernize artillery and abandon the post-Soviet 152 mm calibre in favour of the "Western" 155 mm calibre, currently being adopted by China.
Regardless of the direction of changes that Russian armed forces will undergo in the coming years, by the beginning of the next decade, Moscow will most likely have a rebuilt army. This army could significantly differ from the one that, over three years ago, launched a "three-day special operation" and, instead of achieving a swift victory, became bogged down in Ukraine, suffering its greatest losses since World War II.
