Russia's tank strategy falters as Ukraine conflict escalates

On the eve of the aggression against Ukraine, Russia - according to various estimates - had about 13,000 to 17,500 tanks. Probably only about 3,000 were in active service; the rest were stored.

According to data provided by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion until January 2025, Russia lost 9,679 of them. Currently, this number exceeds 10,000. Meanwhile, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a renowned British think tank specializing in the analysis of international policy, defence, and armed conflicts, estimates that over three years, Ukrainians destroyed about 4,400 tanks.

Regardless, the losses are enormous, and to the front - after repairs and modernizations - several decades-old machines are being sent: T-54, T-55, and T-62. This is because the Russian armament industry is unable to supply a sufficient number of new and technologically advanced tanks.

The modernization plan devised back in 2009 was supposed to steer the Russian army onto new paths. It included, among other things, that within a decade, the army would receive 11,000 modern armoured and armoured vehicles. This involved not only modernized vehicles from previously used families but also new designs expected to revolutionize the battlefield.

Russians primarily aimed to create one universal tracked platform on which a main battle tank, a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, and a combat support vehicle would be produced. The T-14 Armata tank was primarily produced within this series of tracked vehicles, with limited serial production starting in 2016, and the self-propelled howitzer 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, of which only 12 units have been built since 2013.

The other vehicles in the family still exist only as a few prototypes. For example, only three heavy infantry fighting vehicles T-15 Armata were produced. Meanwhile, none of the vehicles meant to dominate the battlefield and become the backbone of the Russian army's armoured forces have met expectations, contrary to numerous announcements.

As early as spring 2022, Russians claimed that T-14 Armata tanks arrived at the "front-line" training ground, albeit in Syria. However, apart from the Russian Ministry of Defence's statement, there is no evidence of this. It was first reported that Armatas were seen at the front in October 2022, but this information was also unconfirmed. Only in January 2023 did British intelligence report that Russians were preparing to send their best vehicles to the front - satellite images showed T-14 at a training ground close to the front lines.

British commentators noted that any deployment of T-14 could be a risky decision for Russia. "Eleven years in development, the programme has been dogged with delays, reduction in planned fleet size, and reports of manufacturing problem."

Three months later, the RIA agency reported that Armatas were deployed in Ukraine, but have not yet participated in direct assault operations. They haven't, and to this day, they haven't taken part. They most likely returned to Russia in June of last year.

The reason is simple. The Russian defence industry couldn't - despite announcements - design and build modern vehicles that wouldn't be prone to malfunctions and would meet military requirements. A prototype of the "best tank in the world" broke down during a rehearsal before the May 8 parade in 2015, and although a decade has passed, it appears Armata is still not perfected.

Just after it was announced that the T-14 would be going to Ukraine, Russian social media reported that crews were dissatisfied with the tank. The engine and drive mechanism were reportedly causing significant problems. The propulsion system turned out to be unreliable and too weak, and Armatas had trouble overcoming terrain obstacles. Additionally, the modern fire control system is based on Western components. When it breaks down, it is irreparable due to sanctions.

Sergey Chemezov, head of Rostec, which produces the T-14, maintained that the tank has considerably better parameters than Western competitors but wouldn't be used in Ukraine because it is too expensive.

This is true - depending on its version, equipment, and technology applied in a given unit, Armata costs between $5 (CAD 7.2) and $9 (CAD 13) million. However, it is still cheaper than the Abrams, the latest version of which is priced at $12 (CAD 17.3) million.

The money saved on the T-14 was supposed to enable the Russian army to purchase the T-90, which costs between $4.5 (CAD 6.5) to $5 (CAD 7.2) million. Probably for this reason, Putin himself demoted Armata and took away its title of "the best tank in the world," transferring it to the T-90. It, along with the T-72B3, will be the main tank of the Russian army.

In 2022, Russia had 350 T-90A tanks and 67 M versions in the line and about 200 in reserve, losing just over 200 units. After switching the Russian industry to wartime mode, about forty T-90s were supposed to be produced monthly. These are probably propaganda reports. In reality, only about fifteen machines are coming off the assembly line.

The T-90M does neither better nor worse than various versions of the T-72, which are workhorses in Ukraine. Most of the fighting takes place in urbanized areas with limited opportunities for manoeuvre warfare, where small spaces aren't ideal for armoured warfare. Moreover, the emergence of new threats such as drones has made some defence measures obsolete regardless of vehicle type.

The most important factor, however, is the crew operating the equipment, and in the case of the Russians, this is not the strongest link in the system, as Ukrainians have repeatedly proven on the battlefield. All these factors have led to individual vehicles appearing on the front line for several months, only in key locations. Strong assaults are beyond the Russians' reach.

Recently, with the strength of a platoon, tanks supported attacks in two places under Sudzha, and near Toretsk, for the first time in almost two weeks, Russians launched an attack using a platoon of T-72 tanks. Of the four vehicles, two were destroyed by Ukrainian drones, and the remaining ones retreated.

Considering the massive losses, poor crew training, and drastically rising war costs, Russians have focused on producing and refurbishing the cheapest and most common T-72 tanks. These have the appropriate ratio of quality, price to survivability on the front. That's why Russians prefer to send slightly worse tanks into battle, but cheaper ones.