Russia's tank crisis: Depleted reserves and unreliable tech
Losses are colossal. Warehouses are being regularly depleted. After three years of intense war in Ukraine, the Russians are being compelled to maximise savings on armoured weaponry. Tanks are deployed in larger numbers only at the most critical sections of the front, and there are insufficient modern machines, which are not as reliable as the Kremlin had promised.
Before the aggression against Ukraine, Russia reportedly had between 13,000 and 17,500 tanks. It is likely that only around 3,000 of these were in active service, with the rest in storage.
According to data provided by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, from the beginning of the invasion until January 2025, Russia lost 9,679 of these tanks. Currently, this number has exceeded 10,000. Meanwhile, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a renowned British think tank specialising in the analysis of international policy, defence, and armed conflicts, estimates that over three years, Ukrainians destroyed about 4,400 tanks.
Regardless, the losses are enormous, and older machines, such as the T-54, T-55, and T-62, are being sent to the front after repairs and modernisation. This is because the Russian armaments industry is unable to supply a sufficient number of new and technologically advanced tanks.
A big Armata, left with a small cannon
The modernisation plan developed back in 2009 was intended to set the Russian army on a new trajectory. It included a goal where, within a decade, the army would receive 11,000 modern armoured and armoured vehicles. This encompassed not only modernised vehicles from previously utilised families but also new designs that were expected to revolutionise the battlefield.
The Russians primarily aimed to create a universal tracked platform that could be used for a main battle tank, a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, and a combat support vehicle. In this series of tracked vehicles, the T-14 Armata tank was primarily produced, with limited serial production starting in 2016. Additionally, the self-propelled howitzer 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV saw only 12 units produced since 2013.
The other vehicles in the family remain only as prototypes. For example, only three T-15 Armata heavy infantry fighting vehicles were produced. None of the vehicles meant to dominate the battlefield and become the cornerstone of the Russian army's armoured forces has met expectations, contrary to numerous announcements.
By spring 2022, Russians claimed that T-14 Armata tanks arrived at a "front-line" training ground, albeit in Syria. However, beyond the Russian Ministry of Defence's statement, there is no proof of this. It was first reported that Armatas were seen at the front in October 2022, but this information was unconfirmed. Only in January 2023 did British intelligence report that Russians were preparing to send their best vehicles to the front—satellite images showed T-14 tanks at a training ground near the front lines.
British commentators observed that any deployment of T-14 could be risky for Russia. "Eleven years in development, the programme has been dogged with delays, reduction in planned fleet size, and reports of manufacturing problem."
Three months later, the RIA agency reported that Armatas were deployed in Ukraine, but have not yet participated in direct assault operations. To this day, they have not been involved in any. It is likely they returned to Russia in June last year.
Two "best tanks in the world"
The reason is straightforward. The Russian defence industry couldn't—despite announcements—design and build modern vehicles that weren't prone to malfunctions and met military requirements. A prototype of the "best tank in the world" broke down during a rehearsal before the May 8 parade in 2015, and although nearly a decade has elapsed, it appears the Armata is still not perfected.
Just after it was announced that the T-14 would be going to Ukraine, Russian social media reported that crews were dissatisfied with the tank. The engine and drive mechanism were reportedly causing significant problems. The propulsion system turned out to be unreliable and too weak, and Armatas had trouble overcoming terrain obstacles. Moreover, the modern fire control system is based on Western components. When it breaks down, it is irreparable due to sanctions.
Sergey Chemezov, head of Rostec, which produces the T-14, claimed that the tank has considerably better parameters than Western competitors but wouldn't be used in Ukraine because it is too expensive.
This claim has merit—depending on its version, equipment, and technology, the Armata costs between €4.6 million and €8.2 million. However, it is still cheaper than the Abrams, the latest version of which is priced at around €11 million.
The money saved on the T-14 was intended to enable the Russian army to purchase the T-90, which costs between €4.2 million and €4.6 million. Probably for this reason, Putin himself demoted the Armata and removed its title of "the best tank in the world," transferring it to the T-90, which, along with the T-72B3, will be the main tank of the Russian army.
Fewer and fewer tanks on the front
In 2022, Russia had 350 T-90A tanks and 67 M versions in service and about 200 in reserve, with losses of just over 200 units. After switching the Russian industry to wartime mode, about forty T-90s were reportedly to be produced monthly. These are likely propaganda reports. In reality, only about fifteen machines are coming off the production line.
The T-90M performs neither better nor worse than various T-72 models, which are serving as the workhorses in Ukraine. Most of the combat takes place in urbanised areas with limited opportunities for manoeuvre warfare, where small spaces aren't ideal for armoured vehicles. Moreover, the emergence of new threats such as drones has made some defensive measures obsolete regardless of vehicle type.
The most important factor, however, is the crew operating the equipment, and in the case of the Russians, this has not proven to be the strongest link in the system, as Ukrainians have repeatedly demonstrated on the battlefield. All these factors have led to individual vehicles appearing at the front line for several months, only in pivotal locations. Robust assaults are beyond the Russians' reach.
Recently, with the strength of a platoon, tanks supported attacks in two places near Sudzha, and near Toretsk, for the first time in almost two weeks, Russians launched an attack using a platoon of T-72 tanks. Of the four vehicles, two were destroyed by Ukrainian drones, and the remaining ones retreated.
Taking into account the massive losses, poor crew training, and the drastically rising costs of the war, the Russians have concentrated on producing and refurbishing the cheapest and most commonly available T-72 tanks. These provide the best balance of quality and price to survivability on the front. That's why the Russians prefer to send slightly older tanks into battle, but less costly ones.
