Europe's ammunition deficit: Crucial challenge in Ukraine conflict
"It's the economy, stupid!"—the slogan under which American President Bill Clinton rose to power—seems—with a slight modification—to be a good guideline for European governments. When Fukuyama's "end of history" was revealed to be a mirage of the long-gone 1990s, the continent's secure future may rely on implementing a simple plan. It can be summed up in two words: "ammunition, stupid!"
The war in Ukraine has consumed ammunition in quantities unimaginable for decades. Although expert analyses—such as forecasts from the American think tank RAND—have long highlighted the risk of a full-scale conflict, the West has almost entirely disarmed itself in the 21st century, building armies more suited to expeditionary operations than fighting on European soil.
This trend was facilitated by the fact that the armed forces became an obvious target for budget savings. For years, cuts in costly development programmes, research work, or equipment orders became the norm across Europe.
The war in Ukraine abruptly reminded Europe of an age-old principle. "If you want peace, prepare for war" - goes the famous Latin phrase. How - in light of Ukrainian experiences - does Europe's defence capability look?
At least 110,000 shells per month
The war in Ukraine is often termed a drone war, but - given the statistics of losses and the nature of the operations - it has become, much like World War I, an artillery war, responsible for most of the casualties and equipment losses.
Both sides fire vast numbers of shells every day. Ukraine's rate ranges from 3,000 to 8,000 shells daily. This rate is at least twice as high for Russia, which produces about 4 million artillery shells annually. According to Ukrainian sources, during the peak period of its artillery activity, Russia fired up to 40,000 shells every day.
In recent weeks, the intensity of Russian fire has reduced by half despite ammunition supplies from North Korea or Iran. As reported earlier this year by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, this reduction is the result of effective Ukrainian strikes on the Russian logistical chain, significantly decreasing the amount of ammunition reaching the front.
Meanwhile, Ukraine's demand - assuming the minimum, lower bound of usage - reaches approximately 110,000 artillery shells per month (Ukrainian decision-makers, when presenting the needs of the Ukrainian army, speak of as many as 330,000-660,000 shells per month). Who can produce that much?
Production smaller than demand
Currently, European and NATO capabilities are primarily estimated based on industry statistics. Before 2022, the United States produced about 14,000 artillery shells of 155 mm calibre monthly.
Even smaller was the scale of roduction in Europe. Poland - which, as revealed by a former prime minister, produced only 30,000-40,000 artillery shells per year, relying on imported propellant charges.
The largest producer of artillery ammunition, Rheinmetall, produced about 70,000 shells annually. As a result, to provide Ukraine with effective assistance, it was necessary to organise an international "ammunition coalition" forced - given the scantiness of its own stockpiles - to purchase shells worldwide.
The West is producing more and more ammunition
At the same time, the West is not ignoring Ukrainian experiences. Rheinmetall alone (the company serves as an example due to available data on production scale) will produce 770,000 shells this year, increasing production tenfold. By 2027, the German company's production lines aim to produce even 1.2 million shells annually, with further increases planned - up to 1.5 million shells.
The industrial machine in the USA has also been set in motion, which plans to produce 100,000 shells per month by 2025.
The scale of production is worth comparing to demand. Assuming the cautious use of 500 Krab and K9 self-propelled howitzers (the framework agreement from 2022 foresees the purchase of 692 K9 howitzers alone!), firing 30-40 shells daily, a day of combat would mean consumption of even 22,000 shells.
Similar analyses—for the Bundeswehr—were presented in 2022 by Frank Haun, head of the German company KMW, and in 2025 by the IFRI institute for the French Air Force. It's important to note that such calculations carry a sizable margin of error and serve more to illustrate the scale of shortages or needs than to predict precisely how quickly Europe would have to truly capitulate.
This is good news for the West, provided it does not neglect further strengthening its defensive potential, as the problem of insufficient stockpiles has already been acknowledged. Although not built overnight, production capacities are being expanded, and production scales are gradually increasing. Although tanks and howitzers fight on the front lines, the war is primarily a clash of economies.
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