Third destruction of Russian pontoon bridge highlights strategic failures

For nearly three years, the Russians have not succeeded in effectively organising crossings over Ukrainian rivers, even during hasty attacks. In every case, it ended disastrously for them. Recently, the Ukrainians destroyed another pontoon bridge on the Sejm River.

Ukrainian artillerymen destroyed a Russian pontoon bridge over the Sejm for the third time. This is the third engineering crossing they have eliminated.

One of the PMP-M sets, or modernised pontoon bridge parks, was destroyed before it even reached the riverbank. Currently, the Russian military cannot deliver supplies or equipment in an area of 640 square kilometres, which corresponds to the territory the Russian army occupied in Ukraine last year.

Thus, the myth of Russian prowess has again fallen regarding overcoming water obstacles. On training grounds, the Russians swiftly and frequently built crossings for tanks, transporters, and even armoured trains. However, in real war conditions, when they stormed water obstacles in haste, they encountered enormous difficulties.

Since the beginning of the war, the Russians have often had to stop before water obstacles. An example is the crossing over the Teterev River north of Kyiv, which took them four days to build despite almost no resistance from the Ukrainian side. Initially, they tried to ford the river, not considering that they first had to cross a wide, muddy valley, significantly hindering their access to the riverbank.

Nearly three years ago, in southern Ukraine, the defence was based on rivers in the Temiriwka, Zieleny Pole, Poltawka, and Hulajpol regions. The Russians didn't even try to cross. The reason was the lack of sufficient ferry equipment in the brigades.

The 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division felt this situation, becoming stuck at the bend of the Donets River at the end of April 2022. Its technical columns were not accompanied by pontoon parks that could have helped in the crossing. Only later did the arrival of the PMP-M set enable the formation of a bridge.

Ukrainian reconnaissance drones continuously monitored the construction of the crossing. And just 20 minutes after its completion, heavy artillery opened fire on it. The Ukrainians specifically waited until the first tanks and armoured carriers entered the crossing. Then they first destroyed the bridge and later the vehicles that got stuck at the bridgehead.

The remains of Russian units were shattered by air attacks – using Su-25 aircraft and combat drones. The Russians lost about 80 vehicles and 485 soldiers, and the battalion group of the 74th Motorised Rifle Brigade was completely destroyed. Only 60–70 soldiers managed to retreat without injury.

To support the retreat and secure the bridgehead, the Russians sent amphibious infantry fighting vehicles, also destroyed by artillery fire before they even reached the other side. Within a few hours, the Russians lost the equivalent of a battalion, representing one of the biggest defeats of their army, also in terms of image. The Kremlin had boasted of its troops' skills in crossing rivers.

The contemporary doctrine of river crossing was developed simultaneously with the development of their armoured-mechanised forces. Already in the 1920s, the first then-modern pontoon bridges were developed and entered the engineer regiments – similar to other armies, including the Polish.

The currently used pontoon bridge system is derived from a construction developed before World War II. At that time, the Red Army was one of the best-prepared for operations on inland waters. The modernised PMP is still considered a good set, although its basic version was introduced in 1962.

One pontoon park consists of 32 trucks with pontoons, four with bridgeheads, two with rolled roadways, 16 BMK-150M tugboats, and a repair vehicle. This allows the formation of bridges with a load capacity from 20 to 170 tonnes and lengths from 13 metres to 382 metres, depending on the hydrological conditions.

Ukrainian rivers usually have wide valleys full of old riverbeds, swamps, and floods, which impede the movement of heavy equipment. Russians must therefore carefully choose construction sites for crossings, as they do not have many options. Additionally, they have not prepared their units for operations under real combat conditions.

Russians repeat the same mistakes during every attempt to build river crossings. Firstly, they do not provide adequate air defence protection. Despite the passage of years, they still do not possess effective electronic warfare measures that could neutralise Ukrainian drones.

Despite the widespread use of reconnaissance drones, the Russians cannot counteract their operations, allowing Ukrainians to quickly and precisely direct artillery fire on crossings.

Russians also have difficulties with counter-battery fire. To effectively neutralise the enemy, one must first determine the position from which shots are fired, which is enabled by artillery radars. Systems such as 1L219 Zoopark can detect rockets from a distance of 40 kilometres and artillery shells from a distance of 10 kilometres. Despite the introduction of radar into service in 1989, even seven years ago, there were too few to outfit all units. In 2017, modernised versions began to enter service, but intelligence data indicate that one radar is allocated per division.

The problem is also the lack of effective communication and an integrated battlefield management system, which prevents the rapid utilisation of acquired information. Thus, detecting shells from a distance of 10 kilometres does not help.

As a result, whether the Russians attempt to cross using pontoon bridges, wading, or using amphibious vehicles, every attempt without properly securing the bridgehead ends in defeat – just like over the Donets or Sejm.