Russia's decaying military: Soviet tactics and logistical chaos

Tactics from the Soviet period, "human wave attacks," and equipment more suited to the late 20th century. The frailty of Russian armoured units is apparent, so where do Putin's army's advancements originate? And how long can Russia continue drawing on its mobilisation reserves when it loses an average of 30-40% of its forces in each skirmish?

Russian armoured-mechanised units have struggled with manoeuvre warfare since the war's outset. Commanders made rookie mistakes, logistical support failed, and soldiers, left to fend for themselves, lost their nerve. This was particularly evident during the battles near Brovary, Kharkiv, and the Ukrainian counteroffensive near Hostomel.

From there, things only worsened. Intense battles near Vuhledar showed that the Russian army's pride was in decay. Why are the losses among Russian armoured-mechanised troops so high? The issue is complex, with roots dating back to Soviet times.

The lost war in Georgia exposed the outdated and rigid military structure derived from the Soviet era, which was unsuitable for modern battlefield conditions. A few months after operations ceased in 2008, the Kremlin began a reform to improve unit mobility, facilitate command, and reduce staff without losing combat capability.

By 2013, the peacetime organisation of armoured forces, which still stemmed from Soviet times, was altered. The highest rank was the army, followed by the division, regiment, and finally, the battalion. Post-reform, the division as a logistical support element was removed, and brigades took over logistical responsibility. This was intended to improve mobility by assigning logistic units directly to tactical battalion groups, much like NATO forces have done for years.

This organisational change was evident in the first months of the war in Ukraine, but in the Russian version... it completely failed. Observing the logistical operations, the chaos among the Russians was clear. Mechanised columns stuck to main, wide roads because the logistical convoys accompanying them didn't allow for other maneuvers.

Once the columns ventured onto narrow or dirt roads, they got stuck in mud or tight streets and were quickly neutralised. Consequently, as seen in videos online, columns with tankers passing through residential areas had to wait patiently because they couldn't leave fuel tankers or ammunition trucks unprotected and still expect them to reach their destination.

The reform might have made sense, but it was due to the disorganisation and Russian inefficiency. The Americans demonstrated how it should be done in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm and again in 2003 during the capture of Baghdad. Airborne units secured bridges, and swift mechanised forces with strong direct air support broke through Iraqi defence lines and marched to the city centre.

The American attack was methodical: first, paratroopers secured key positions, then reconnaissance teams fanned out to find the best routes, followed by combat groups under infantry cover. Artillery was the third line, and logisticians at the very end organised forward staging points for immediate supplies. The Americans did not break stride for shortages, unlike the Russians.

The Americans have honed the tactics from the Arabian Peninsula since World War II, allowing them to perfect the details and instil the doctrine even in rank-and-file soldiers. The Russians had far less time and did not reform their training system.

Another fundamental mistake by the Russians was failing to adapt the training system for conscripts and contract soldiers to the requirements of real military operations. Soldiers were trained to perform tasks on training grounds under comfortable exercise conditions. There was no interference with deployment. Artillery fired from prepared positions with the support of drones, and air forces flew freely over the battlefield. This training process looked impressive during official demonstrations but failed in actual combat.

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, company and battalion commanders have struggled with field command. They committed tactical errors: moving in tight columns, lacking air defence, and neglecting reconnaissance. To make matters worse, group commanders couldn't cooperate with artillery and air forces, rendering ground forces without close air support.

A prime example was the battle near Brovary, where a regiment was directly led by its commander in the first tank. When his tank was destroyed, the column stopped in the middle of the city, and Ukrainian artillery thoroughly annihilated it. Logistics failed. Morale collapsed. Desertions began, and abandoned equipment littered the fields. Had it not been for these failures, the Russian armoured regiment might have entered Kyiv from the east.

As time passed, the situation for the Russians deteriorated. Experienced soldiers were either killed or had to recover. Now, the army is commanded by people without formal education and experience, burdened by political demands, preventing them from acting according to military principles.

This was evident recently near Vuhledar and Kurakhove, where the Russians reverted to tactics developed by the Soviets a century ago. This involves artillery preparation followed by a tank and infantry assault. This strategy only works due to the high numerical advantage of the Russians, who can afford significant losses. Near Kurakhove, they lost about 60% of the forces used in the attack due to the commanders’ lack of understanding of the tactical situation.

The largest problem for the Russians on the battlefield is the lack of reconnaissance at the tactical level. Their drones, like the Orlan-10, are very technologically inferior. Additionally, Ukrainians destroy them so effectively that domestic defence factories cannot keep up with replacing losses. Hence the purchases from Iran, looking elsewhere, and using makeshift solutions.

Combat units often have no idea what lies just 3 kilometres ahead. They don't know whether the vehicles in front are friendly or Ukrainian, where to strike to hit a gap in the defence, or how to direct artillery fire effectively.

Another issue for the Russians is that both sides still use equipment from the Soviet era. Without identification friend or foe systems in ground forces and the lack of light reconnaissance tools, including drones, the Russians are forced to paint large letter markings on vehicle hulls to avoid mistaking their vehicles for enemy ones in the chaos of battle.

The Russian army is poorly trained and even more poorly commanded. Line commanders are visibly lost, and Moscow staff pressures them to accomplish assigned tasks. For years, officers loyal to the regime have been promoted over those who proved themselves capable, hence the recurring "human wave attacks."

Those sent to execute these attacks are soldiers who have been in the reserve for years and underwent only cursory refresher training before being sent to the front. Moreover, they are equipped with gear mostly pulled from forgotten warehouses, so their Fire Control Systems, communication systems, and armament are, at best, from the late 20th century.

This all means that Russian losses will continue to grow, and the minimal successes they achieve on the front will be paid for with increasing casualties. Russians can only continue operations as long as they can draw on their mobilisation reserves, which are not limitless.